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Plans and Expectations: The American News Media and Postwar Japan 
Dayna Barnes, University of San Francisco 
 
 
The US-Japanese relationship became one of the most significant and enduring of the second 
half of the twentieth century. Yet, such a relationship would have been unimaginable to 
Americans before the end of World War Two. This article examines popular representations of 
Japan and China before and during the war, assesses the ideas of key figures from the press, and 
considers the ways in which media and policy interacted through the influence of opinion 
leaders. These prepared the way for the ‘soft’ peace relying on Japanese cooperation that would 
become the basis for a new alliance between America and Japan. 
 
 
The US-Japanese relationship became one of the most significant and enduring of the second 
half of the twentieth century. Yet, such a relationship would have been unimaginable to 
Americans before the end of World War Two. At that time, Americans expected China, not Japan, 
to become America’s Asian ally and the bulwark of the new international system in East Asia. In 
order to understand these expectations for postwar East Asia during the war, this article will 
examine popular representations of Japan and China, assess the ideas of key figures from the 
press, and consider the ways in which media and policy interacted through the influence of 
opinion leaders.1 
 
As media analyst Jonathan Alter argues, ‘logic can convince but only emotion can motivate’.2 
Popular sympathy with China and visceral hatred of the Japanese were driving forces of public 
morale in the Pacific theater.3 What provided the driving force for America’s emotional response 
to Japan as an enemy nation during World War Two? Lacking first-person experience of Asia or 
Asians on which to hang news reports, how did citizens understand ‘the nature of the enemy’ or 
know ‘why we fight’? Popular media and entertainment created lasting images and broad 
pictures of Japan, China, and the people who lived in these countries. Public opinion polls in the 
period reveal a shocking ignorance of basic knowledge about the world, and especially Asia. In a 
survey carried out in 1940, for example, respondents expressed opinions on Japanese expansion 
into Southeast Asia and an oil embargo, but only 1.3 percent claimed to know where Singapore, 
a strategically important British holding, was located.4 The geography, history, politics and 
cultures of East Asia in the American mind were like the blank interiors of unexplored continents 
in maps from previous centuries. 
 
But popular publications and public opinion are only a part of the story of how the media 
influenced American policy on the treatment of postwar Japan. The figures who wrote on this 
question drew influence not just from their connection to the reading public, but also from their 
ties to policy-making circles. Through the personal correspondence of decision makers and 
thinkers, it is possible to reconstruct what sources these figures were reading, recommending, 
                                                 
1 Casey uses the term ‘opinion leaders’ to group ‘journalists, editors, and commentators’; Casey, Cautious Crusade, 
16. 
2 Alter, The Promise, 140. 
3 Wartime hatred of Japan has been explored in Dower, War Without Mercy, and Chappell, Before the Bomb. 
4 ‘Questions on the Far East,’ December 1940. Princeton Poll Folder, PJF (Subject). Roosevelt Library. 
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and discussing amongst themselves.5 While other journalists will also be considered, this article 
focuses on two well-known opinion leaders; Henry Luce and Walter Lippmann. These figures 
were in a powerful position to disseminate their ideas on East Asia. As writers, influential 
journalists could reach large audiences with their books, articles and editorial pieces. Publishers 
and editors played a key role in relaying published information to target audiences, acting as 
gatekeepers through their power to select the opinions and ideas made available through their 
platforms. Published material was not the only, or even the most important, connection between 
opinion leaders and policy makers on the Japan question. Media elites, bureaucrats and 
politicians also shared ideas informally through telephone conversations, over dinners, and at 
social events. Especially powerful or respected figures were invited to become involved in 
planning committees and informal deliberation. More than simply outlining a range of available 
options to decision makers, these men became a part of the debate; a crucial component in the 
policy-making process. Political leaders, bureaucrats, area experts and engaged citizens all 
grappled with the ideas promoted by opinion leaders during the war. Taken together, popular and 
specialist publications formed the basis of American discourse on East Asia. They filled the sea 
of ideas in which policy-makers swam. The men behind those publications, tied to planners by 
personal and professional relationships, swam alongside them.  
 
Popular Media 
 
Asia Coverage before Pearl Harbor 
 
Prior to 1941, most Americans with personal experience in China fell into one of two camps. 
They were either, like President Franklin Roosevelt’s maternal grandfather, businessmen 
interested in China trade, or, like the parents of many mid-century Asia experts, missionaries. 
America was not unique in this respect. Missionaries and traders were at the forefront of early 
East-West interactions. Missionaries went to places other Westerners did not go, interacted with 
locals as they made converts and provided social services, and remained in the country for 
extended periods. As a result, they had a special position as the ‘face’ of their home country in 
China, and were also key sources of information about exotic locales back home.6 Because of 
differences in the treaties China and Japan had signed with the Western countries in the mid-
nineteenth century, the missionary link was far stronger with China. The connection resulted in a 
sense of a historical ‘special relationship’ for the United States, and created the impression of a 
China in need of American help.7  
 
Events in the early 1930s also swayed popular sympathy toward China ahead of the coming 
crisis. Chiang Kai-shek’s conversion to Christianity endeared his regime to existing sinophiles 
and helped to make the Chinese appear more ‘like’ the Christian-majority United States. Pearl S. 
Buck, an author raised in China by missionary parents, published a popular novel on China in 
1931.8 The Good Earth was then made into an Academy Award winning film in 1938. Buck 
parlayed her success into the publication of pro-Chinese articles in the American media. 
                                                 
5 Rudolf Janssens relied on reading lists in his analysis of government consumption of published material on Japan. 
Janssens, What Future for Japan?, 79. However, only a handful of government departments, none of which were 
central to the process of planning for Japan, created such lists. I have therefore relied on correspondence and other 
evidence in collections of personal papers.  
6 For an examination of this phenomenon in the context of British imperialism, see Porter, ‘Religion, Missionary 
Enthusiasm, and Empire’, 222–46. 
7 Park, ‘Guiding Public Opinion on the Far Eastern Crisis,’ 393. 
8 Jespersen, American Images of China, 25. 
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Influential figures like Buck, media mogul Henry Luce and academic Owen Lattimore 
championed China in the national press.9 In addition, many American reporters preferred 
working in China to Japan, partially because it had a larger established expatriate community. 
The majority of reporting on the Sino-Japanese conflict was done in China, which meant that 
American reporters saw the war alongside the Chinese. Foreign journalists experienced Japanese 
aerial bombings on Chongqing, even sharing shelters with Chinese officials, and their reports 
were subject to Chinese censorship before transmission.10 Official censorship was matched by 
self-censorship by journalists. American war correspondent Martha Gellhorn stated that self-
censorship, created by a sense of obligation to powerful Chinese hosts, was the greater hindrance 
to accurate reporting.11 Nationalistic support of an American ally, the belief that criticism of 
China would strengthen the position of an aggressive Japan, and a professional desire to be 
allowed to return to China all served to soften reporting on China by American reporters in and 
out of China.12 
 
In contrast to China coverage, the 1930s media portrayed Japan as a dangerous actor, even as 
business links between the countries continued. At the zenith of trade in the mid-1930s, Japan 
was America’s third-largest trade partner.13 Japan remained economically important for the US as 
it pursued an aggressive foreign policy at odds with American interests. Between 1935 and 1939, 
fully a quarter of Japan’s imports came from the US.14 Unlike China, Japan had not been home to 
large numbers of American missionaries or businessmen. America had initiated and championed 
the idea of an “open door” policy from the last year of the nineteenth century, nominally freeing 
China from colonization by allowing colonial powers equal access to its market. In part because 
of the strength of Meiji Japan, there had been no equivalent sponsorship on which Americans 
could hang a narrative of patronage.15 Japan also lacked popular champions in the American 
media. China was praised for its affinity with the United States as a ‘democratic-type’ society by 
Luce, Buck and Lattimore, creating a false impression of Chinese politics in American minds. 
Japan, which had a Western-style constitution and parliament, and from 1925 had universal male 
suffrage, was not referred to as a democracy or a ‘democratic-type’ society in public discourse.16 
For informed citizens, Japan menaced America’s colony in the Far East, the Philippines. In the 
1930s the perceived danger of Japan swallowing whole a newly-independent Philippines was a 
major factor in slowing American disengagement there.17 In the run-up to Pearl Harbor, the press 
was vocal in supporting China by pushing for an embargo against Japan. The resulting pressure 
to take a tough line with Japan caused President Roosevelt to complain to his Secretary of the 
                                                 
9 Luce and Lattimore are discussed as part of a group of ‘opinion leaders’ below. 
10 Park, ‘Guiding Public Opinion on the Far Eastern Crisis,’ 395. 
11 Moreira, ‘Hemingway on the China Front,’ 146. 
12 Tuchman, ‘Stilwell and the American Experience in China,’ 251. 
13 Wilkins, ‘The Role of U.S. Business.’ 
14 Imports from the US to Japan were mostly cotton, iron and oil. Import trade figures remained stable in the 1930s. 
Japan’s exports to the US, however, declined from a high in 1925–1929 of 37% to 14.3% by 1939 as Korea and 
Manchuria became more important to Japan’s economy. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 211. 
15 This is not to say there was no business or missionary link with Japan. State Department member Eugene 
Dooman, for example, was born in Japan as the child of missionary parents. Haruo Iguchi writes about business 
links in Unfinished Business. There were also a small number of expatriates resident in Japan before the war. Wilfrid 
Fleisher, former editor of the Japan Advisor in Tokyo, is an example. His book on postwar plans was published and 
reviewed by American news outlets.  
16 Japan took a distinct turn away from democracy in the 1930s when the country formed ‘national unity cabinets’ in 
response to political violence and instability. These cabinets shifted power from political parties in favor of the 
military. Nevertheless, the political system in Japan from the late nineteenth century was intentionally based on 
‘modern’ Western models. 
17 Kotlowski, ‘Independence or Not?’, 502. 
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Interior, ‘I think the whole business of exports to Japan was made difficult by the press and the 
press only.’18 Government reports noted that the ‘extraordinarily bellicose tone toward Japan’ in 
the press was not reflected in Gallup polls surveying public opinion.19 The aggressive stance may 
have been intended to attract an audience to a topic of limited general interest. 
 
The crisis in the Far East was far from the top of the national agenda. Media support for action in 
East Asia was predicated on the assumption that involvement would not be costly for the US. 
Concern for China did not translate into public support for serious American intervention in the 
conflict. Gallup polls in 1937 and 1938 demonstrated that the vast majority of Americans wanted 
to limit US interests in the area by having its nationals leave the country and were opposed to 
loans or arms shipments to China.20 Although in 1938 polls indicated that 76 percent of 
Americans supported US retention of the Philippines, isolationists argued that abandoning that 
interest was necessary to avoid becoming drawn into conflict with expansionist Japan.21 While 
certainly covered by the press, the Sino-Japanese War was treated as a ‘distant sideshow,’ far less 
important than domestic issues or events in Europe.22 
 
Wartime Coverage 
 
During the war, the press depicted the Japanese using images of monkeys, and described the 
nation’s population as a mere collection of ‘reproductions from the same negative’.23 However, 
negative racial stereotyping was made complicated by the fact that America’s chief ally and 
enemy in the Pacific were both Asian nations. In 1942, liberal columnist Anne O’Hare 
McCormick declared optimistically that ideology alone, not race, would be an issue in the war. 
The ‘color line,’ she wrote, had been ‘broken down’ by Axis aggression, so that ‘light peoples 
and dark peoples [could] see that the peril is not yellow or white. China is on our side and Japan 
is on Germany’s because common ideas override superficial differences.’24 This was further 
reinforced by stories of loyalty and shared suffering endured by Filipinos after Japan’s 
occupation of the American colony. As one article noted, the Filipinos, ‘representing many 
different racial strains, have proved themselves to be as fine a people as is to be found anywhere 
on this earth.’25 The Office of War Information actively discouraged the movie industry from 
employing racist characterizations in film depictions of the Japanese, and was concerned that the 
Japanese people be separated from their leadership in the public mind.26 It monitored film 
depictions of China and Japan through a Bureau of Motion Pictures which created a manual for 
reference on American policy, reviewed screenplays, wrote dialogue, and encouraged changes to 
scripts.27 ‘China,’ the OWI manual asked movie-makers to remember, ‘is a great nation, cultured 
and liberal, with whom, inevitably, [the US] will be closely bound in the world that is to come.’28 
Hollywood was encouraged not to stoke race hatred in the case of Japan. Rather than showing 
                                                 
18 FDR to Harold Ickes, 1 July 1941, PSF (Dept) Interior, Ickes. Roosevelt Library. 
19 Alan Barth to Ferdinand Kuhn, 8 August 1941. PSF (Dept) Treasury, Editorial Opinion. Roosevelt Library.  
20 Gallup, The Gallup Poll. 
21 Kotlowski, ‘Independence or Not?’, 512. 
22 Casey, Cautious Crusade, 29. 
23 Dower, War Without Mercy, 38.  
24 McCormick, ‘Abroad’. 
25 ‘Post-war Amity with Japan Urged’. 
26 Koppes and Black, Hollywood Goes to War, 250. 
27 Ibid., vii.  
28 Jespersen, American Images of China, 77. 
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caricatures of the ‘little buck toothed treacherous Jap,’ the OWI manual advised writers that 
fascism, not race, was the issue.29 
 
From the outbreak of the war, media coverage reinforced existing support for China, highlighting 
its long resistance against what had now become a common enemy. Time responded to the Asian 
issue by attempting to differentiate the Chinese from the Japanese in racial and cultural terms. In 
late December 1941 it published a feature piece to help readers distinguish ‘your friends’ the 
Chinese from ‘Japs’ using a checklist of physical and behavioral characteristics. Chinese facial 
expressions, for example, were ‘more placid, kindly, [and] open’ while Japanese were ‘dogmatic, 
[and] arrogant.’ 30 Chinese were taller and had toe placement similar to Europeans. By reporting 
that the Chinese were physically closer to Europeans, Time created a comforting narrative of a 
people ‘like us.’  
 
An optimistic view of China as an ally was also reflected in the media and public expectations 
for the country’s future. Vice President Henry Wallace announced in a national radio broadcast 
that trade with China and Russia would revitalize the American Pacific Northwest region and 
create factory jobs that would smooth the transition back to a peacetime economy. Japan, which 
had been America’s largest trade partner and the most developed economy in the region, was 
notably absent from Wallace’s ‘Era of the Pacific.’31 But trade and investment were not the only 
benefits postwar China had to offer. Pearl S. Buck anticipated that China would make moral and 
political contributions to the coming new world order. ‘What has China to offer a post-war 
world?’ Buck asked in a speech at New York’s Carnegie Hall. ‘China will be the wisest of all. 
She will have more than any other country to contribute to that [postwar] world out of her 4,000 
years of human history, out of her wisdom in human relationships… and out of her conviction of 
the worth of the individual.’32 Such statements built up unrealistic expectations about the future 
role of a war-torn and politically unstable nation.  
 
While in-country reporting certainly helped foster sympathy for China, it also resulted in 
negative accounts once perceptions began to change. As American congressman Walter Judd 
pointed out, reporters rarely had the benefit of long experience in the country. As a result, 
Americans were ‘being deluged nowadays with a flood of reports from people who do not have 
an adequate background of experience in Asia.’33 Lacking context, such reports were based on 
brief impressions and previously held ideas. New correspondents were influenced by early over-
enthusiastic accounts of ‘a country endowed with more than human qualities… a democracy 
pure and Jeffersonian,’ led by selfless and noble leadership.34 A report from Britain’s Washington 
Embassy noted in July 1944 that ‘those sections of the public who think about it at all are now 
rather bewildered. They are beginning to doubt whether China will be a friendly democracy 
protecting American interests in the Pacific and whether the China market will be so lucrative 
after all.’35 Once skepticism set in, they unfavorably compared the China they encountered to a 
previously-held idealized version or to the United States itself.36  
 
                                                 
29 Koppes and Black, Hollywood Goes to War, 250. 
30 ‘Home Affairs’. 
31 Wallace, ‘The Era of the Pacific’. 
32 ‘Chinese Envoy Sees Offensive in Asia’; Pearl S Buck at United China Relief ‘Tribute to China’ Rally at Carnegie 
Hall. 
33 Walter Judd had himself been a missionary in China for ten years. Judd, ‘What Is the Truth About China?’. 
34 Peffer, ‘Our Distorted View of China’. Quoted in Jespersen, American Images of China, 402. 
35 Quoted in Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 422. 
36 McCormick, ‘Abroad’. 
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Media coverage of the war also helped to harden views against Japan, an enemy nation. The 
Japanese were portrayed as fanatical, deeply conformist and even subhuman. Such 
characterizations, combined with accounts of war crimes, ‘eroded nearly all compassion for the 
Japanese, soldiers or civilians,’ in the United States.37 Revelations in 1944 boosted anti-Japanese 
sentiment and led to calls for retribution in place of a soft peace.38 Reports on the Bataan Death 
March and the abuse of prisoners of war were released in January of that year. 39 These were 
followed by desperate and bloody battles as America’s island-hopping campaign moved forward. 
A Time piece published in August described to readers the ‘gruesome deeds, incomprehensible to 
the occidental mind’ of Japanese civilians.40 Accounts of fighting to the death and civilian suicide 
reinforced the existing characterization of the Japanese as racially distinct fanatics. 
 
Postwar Plans 
 
No clear plan for postwar Japan was made available to the public during the war. At the time, 
plans were being formulated by a small group of State Department area specialists working in a 
subcommittee of a State War Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) tasked with broader 
postwar planning. However, it was not clear that the work of this group would become policy 
until Harry Truman signed off on an overview of their recommendations in June of 1945.41 
SWNCC plans often diverged from Roosevelt’s mercurial thoughts on Asia, and there were other 
potential sources of future planning throughout the war. Because of policy confusion under 
President Roosevelt, there were no officially adopted plans to publicize. In addition, it was felt 
that public discussion about postwar plans could put the Administration in a difficult position. 
Committing to a set position during the war would make it more difficult to make concessions to 
allies or change course. While using the media as a mechanism for informing the public about 
major decisions and non-secret international agreements, the Administration aimed to limit 
discussion of the postwar world in the press. ‘I have not the slightest objection towards your 
trying your hands at an outline of the postwar picture,’ Roosevelt told planners, but cautioned, 
‘for heaven’s sake don’t even let the columnists hear of it.’42 As a result, government plans for 
defeated Japan were largely a mystery to ordinary Americans.  
 
Despite these limitations, major newspapers were able to provide readers with a remarkable 
range of voices on the subject of postwar Asia. The press covered major international 
conferences and agreements.43 Letters to the editor, book reviews, reprinted speeches by leading 
figures and conference summaries provided nuanced perspectives on the Japan question. Many 
of these views, especially from officials or experts close to official planning circles, were quite 
close to recommendations being developed in the State Department. Former Ambassador Joseph 
Grew’s 1943 speaking tour in particular brought the debates from closed planning circles into the 
public sphere. The speeches and subsequent news reports included key elements of plans for 
Japan. As did official planners, Grew argued before the public that it would be ‘folly’ to make 
                                                 
37 Chappell, Before the Bomb, 98. 
38 Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 492.  
39 ‘Japanese Atrocities to Prisoners of War,’ 31 January, 1944. Doc-No: H.doc.393m Serial-Volume: 10878 
Congress-Session: 78-2 (1944) Sessional-Volume: 14, LexisNexis Congressional Hearings Digital Collection. 
40 ‘World Battlefronts: The Nature of the Enemy’. 
41 5-C-8, SC-138, 23 June 1945. Iokibe, ed., Occupation of Japan: US Planning Documents, 1942-1945. 
42 FDR to Adolf Berle, 26 June 1941. Box 22. PSF (Dept) State, Roosevelt Library. 
43 For example, reporting on the Cairo declaration, a New York Times journalist explained plans for Japan’s 
disarmament and loss of territory, and the rise of China as a world power. ‘Tokyo’s co-prosperity sphere,’ he wrote, 
‘will be entirely scrapped.’ And ‘from the ashes’ of Japan’s empire a ‘new and greater China’ would rise. Sulzberger, 
‘Conferences Fixed Shape of World to Come’. 
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Japan a permanent outcast from the family of nations. While retribution would leave Japan ‘a 
festering sore’ on the international body politic, stability depended on convincing that Japanese 
people that they stood to ‘gain by playing the game with the rest of the world,’ especially in 
terms of economic growth and trade.44 This sentiment was echoed throughout the war as the 
press covered liberal and intellectual groups like the Universities Committee on Post-war 
International Problems and the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America. The 
Universities Committee argued that ‘we must teach Japan not only that aggression does not pay, 
but that peaceful international collaboration does pay,’ while the Federal Council of Churches 
recommended that postwar Japan be demilitarized and ‘re-educated’ by fostering pre-war ‘liberal 
elements,’ made a member of the international community and given access to markets.45 Such 
thinking was at the heart of bureaucratic plans for a soft peace and reported on in the press. 
 
Media coverage also offered views that were not in line with specialist planning, including calls 
for a tough peace or for vengeance against the enemy. Book reviews provided neat summaries of 
alternative plans. Pacific Charter, written by a New York Times correspondent, declared that the 
Pacific theater of World War Two was not a war against the militarists currently in power but 
against ‘Japan, the nation, the race.’ The book called for Japan’s towns and villages to be crushed 
after the war so that the ‘Japanese people will know from their own experience what they have 
been inflicting on other peoples.’46 A 1945 New York Times book review began with a disturbing 
anecdote about well-heeled Americans at a dinner party cheerfully discussing exterminating the 
population of Japan after the war. The writer made a blithe segue to reviewing a work by 
longtime Japan resident Wilfrid Fleisher, asking, ‘assuming… that we can’t and won’t kill 
73,000,000 people – what can we do with them?’ Major George Fielding Eliot’s Hour of Triumph 
took quite a different approach. He warned that plans focusing on preventing future violence by 
containing current enemies were nearsighted. While agreeing that postwar Japan would need to 
be monitored but also allowed industry and trade (‘60,000,000 Japanese can’t live by raising 
rice’), Eliot anticipated future causes of unrest. Focusing on Japan and Germany at the expense 
of anti-colonialism in Asia and Anglo-American rivalry with Russia in Europe, he argued, would 
be dangerous. Postwar plans for Japan, Eliot wisely noted, were ‘in danger of preparing to avert 
the last war, not the next.’47 Wartime coverage of postwar plans thus exposed readers to a range 
of nuanced and informed opinion in addition to racist and extreme views. 
  
Opinion Leaders  
 
Walter Lippmann  
 
Walter Lippmann, perhaps the best-known commentator on world affairs of the time, had 
columns reprinted in 160 newspapers with a combined circulation of eight million.48 A native 
New Yorker, Lippmann attended Harvard six years behind FDR.49 As author of several well-
received books and a widely syndicated columnist, Lippmann was already an established public 
intellectual in the years before the war. His first book, published in 1912 when Lippmann was 
                                                 
44 ‘Opposes Making Japan an Outcast’. 
45 ‘Would Readmit Japan’, ‘Grouping of Nations For Peace Proposed’, and Porter, ‘Church Program for Peace 
Voted’. 
46 Chamberlin, ‘When the Orient is Set Free,’ and Chamberlain, ‘Books of the Times’ (1943). 
47 Chamberlain, ‘Books of the Times’ (1944). 
48 Casey, Cautious Crusade, 21.  
49 The future president enjoyed a taste of journalism as president of Harvard’s student publication, Crimson. 
Lippmann, though already interested in writing and current affairs, was not invited to join, perhaps because his 
Jewish background kept him outside some elite social circles. Steele, Walter Lippmann, 28.  
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just 23 years old, was admired by Teddy Roosevelt, who began a correspondence with the young 
writer.50 Lippmann then served during the Great War as the youngest member of ‘the Inquiry,’ 
Woodrow Wilson’s postwar planning project.51 Lippmann considered himself to be a political 
realist, and, like Henry Luce, advocated a more active American engagement in world affairs.52 
For Lippmann, protecting American interests, military and strategic, ought to be the primary 
driver of American policy. His column on current affairs and American foreign policy, ‘Today 
and Tomorrow,’ was read by millions of ordinary Americans as well as leading lights of the 
establishment, and was brought into debates on foreign policy and the postwar world.  
 
Senior statesmen professed themselves to be deeply influenced by Lippmann’s publications. 
Congressmen with quite different views wrote him throughout the war to praise or challenge his 
articles, and his work was also read into the congressional record.53 In 1940 Edward Stettinius, 
then administrator of the Lend Lease program and later to become Secretary of State, wrote to 
praise a recent article and declared that he had ‘followed [Lippmann’s] writings for years.’ James 
F. Byrnes, who would succeed Stettinius as Secretary of State, also felt ‘compelled’ to write 
Lippmann in June 1945 to share his thoughts on an article about postwar power structures. 
Outside the State Department, Secretary of War Henry Stimson remarked that he agreed with 
Lippmann’s approach to postwar planning and informed the journalist, ‘I have been 
recommending a reading of your book to everybody that I can.’54 Although not a policy maker 
himself, Lippmann became an important figure in postwar planning as a result of the currency of 
his ideas through newspaper articles and book publications. The approval of the figures he 
influenced was needed to move the policy drafts up for presidential consideration before they 
could become policy, and congressional support was needed to fund any planned occupation or 
reorientation efforts, as well as to ratify a peace treaty with defeated Japan.  
 
What kind of ideas did Lippmann spread with regard to Japan in particular? Like many 
generalists, his attention was focused mainly on the Atlantic and relations with European powers. 
However, as the Far Eastern Crisis began to threaten American security Lippmann’s views on 
US-East Asian relations underwent a significant shift. In 1931, he had argued that the United 
States ought not become involved in the Manchurian crisis, because it had ‘no particular political 
interest’ in the ‘whole great region.’ Rather, he believed that any response to the crisis should be 
taken by nations which, unlike America, had a ‘definite stake in the area.’55 Already by 1937, this 
viewpoint was coming under scrutiny. In a review of an article submitted to Foreign Affairs, the 
editor and then close friend Hamilton Fish Armstrong remarked that Lippmann ought to make it 
clear in his piece that the US did in fact have important interests in what he called the ‘Eastern 
Pacific.’56  
                                                 
50 Reminiscences of Walter Lippmann, Columbia University Oral History Project, 5.  
51 Steele, Walter Lippmann, 128–40.  
52 In fact, his 1944 book, U.S. War Aims, is reminiscent of Luce in its call for an ‘American destiny’ to become the 
global leader as the inheritor of Western civilization. See Lippmann, U.S. War Aims, 209. 
53 See, for example, Walter Lippmann to Senator Borah, 24 February 1939. Box 57, Folder 258, Reel 48, Walter 
Lippmann Papers, Yale University, and Senator Vandenberg to Walter Lippmann, 14 December 1944. Box 132, 
Folder 2589, Reel 93. Walter Lippmann Papers, Yale University. 
54 Stettinius to Lippmann, 30 May 1940. Box 103, Folder 2001, Reel 92. Walter Lippmann Papers, Yale University. 
James Byrnes to Walter Lippmann, 30 April 1945. Box 59 Folder 355, Reel 50. Walter Lippmann Papers, Yale 
University. Henry L Stimson to Lippmann, 1 June 1943. Box 104, Folder 2007, Reel 93. Walter Lippmann Papers, 
Yale University. 
55 Walter Lippmann, as cited in McPherson, ‘Review of Walter Lippmann and the American Century.’ 
56 Hamilton Fish Armstrong to Walter Lippmann, 31 March 1937. Box 52 Folder 105 Reel 42. Walter Lippmann 
papers, Yale University. 
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During the war, Lippmann’s best-selling book US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic 
revealed the dramatic turn his thinking had taken. Moving on from his prior view that East Asia 
was a region in which the US had no significant interests, Lippmann argued that from the 
nineteenth century the US had ‘placed itself at the geographical center of the empires of Eastern 
Asia’ with the acquisition of Alaska, Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines.57 This change was 
crucial to Lippmann’s views on American relations with the nations of the northern Pacific, 
because, in his conception of foreign policy, ‘interest’ was the prerequisite for heavy involvement 
abroad. It was also an influential view. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Stimson debated 
Lippmann’s ideas as expressed in the book shortly after its publication. Stimson specifically 
urged Hull to read again the chapter on ‘historical analysis of American policy,’ which outlined 
America’s deep and entrenched interests in the Pacific.58  
 
Lippmann and postwar plans 
 
From 1943 until the end of the war, Lippmann’s recommendations for the treatment of postwar 
Japan remained unsettled and even contradictory. He neatly described his stark view of an 
empire-less Japan’s future as a sidelined nation, ‘She is to be an island nation near a continent 
where she has no foothold, and in an ocean which others command.’59 The problems Lippmann 
foresaw in dealing with defeated Japan were twofold. First, the Allies needed to create a peace 
treaty and postwar order that the Japanese themselves would accept. Like official area specialists, 
Lippmann argued that a harsh or punitive peace could not last. Japan had to be assured access to 
markets and raw materials, and must ‘be able to earn a decent living peaceably.’ His reasoning 
for this position, however, was based on a conservative assessment of America’s ability to 
impose terms or radical changes on a foreign country. In stark contrast to the far-reaching plans 
being developed within the government, Lippmann rejected the proposition that America should 
‘run’ postwar Japan during a transformative occupation, writing ‘we cannot manage a Japanese 
revolution.’60  
 
Lippmann drew his second idea on the danger of postwar Japan from balance of power 
arguments in circulation at the time. He argued that the potential existed for Japan’s power to be 
reconstituted as a counterweight in case of any postwar rivalry between the Allies. Discord 
between China, Russia and the United States might lead to any one of those countries supporting 
a Japanese revival and courting the former enemy for support. In US War Aims, Lippmann 
argued that there was the possibility of strife between any of the three Allied Powers in East 
Asia, but thought it most likely that China or Russia would support Japan in order to strengthen 
their positions in any territorial conflict along their long shared land border.61 It was therefore 
competition between the Allies which might make Japan a danger in the future. 
 
Despite confirmed American interests in Asia and the potential of future rivalry for influence 
over postwar Japan, Lippmann held that the United States should not take leadership in handling 
Japan after the war. Rather, he argued that China ought to take the initiative in reconstruction and 
                                                 
57 Lippmann, US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, 24. 
58 11 May 1943, 31. Reel 8. Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.  
59 Lippmann, US War Aims, 101. 
60 Lippmann, US War Aims, 105–106.  
61 Surprisingly, Great Britain did not play a major role in postwar East Asia in Lippmann’s analysis. However, he 
does note its value to America as an ally, especially because of its available bases around the world. Walter 
Lippmann, US War Aims, 104. 
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rehabilitation, and possess the final say in the length and character of the occupation, as well as 
any issues of reform might arise. This position was radically different from the mainstream belief 
that, of the Allies, the United States ought to set the agenda for Japan and international security 
in the Pacific. No expert on Asia, Walter Lippmann was himself deeply influenced by the ideas 
of Owen Lattimore on China.62 In common with many leading figures, including President 
Roosevelt, Lippmann believed that ‘the peace of the Pacific has turned and will turn upon 
China,’ which would emerge from the war as a ‘new great power in the modern world.’63 While 
such an optimistic appraisal of Chinese power was common, the idea that China would not only 
participate but would lead the occupation of Japan was not. Readings of Lippmann, a well-
known and respected analyst, thus reinforced the hopeful thinking and expectations about 
China’s role in the postwar world which would ultimately be disappointed.  
 
Henry Luce 
 
Henry Luce, head of Time Inc and a commentator in his own right, played a double role as 
author and editor. In common with many Westerners interested in Far Eastern affairs in the 1930s 
and 1940s, he had been the child of missionaries stationed in Asia. Born in Shandong, China, at 
the end of the nineteenth century, his upbringing deeply influenced his world view. As an adult 
Luce felt sympathy with Nationalist China and a missionary zeal for spreading American values 
around the globe through a robust and active foreign policy.64 Encouraging the support and 
development of China using the patronage of the United States, which he saw as a mutually 
beneficial relationship, was a driving passion in his life.  
 
In 1941, he wrote his most influential piece, an editorial in Life entitled ‘The American Century.’ 
The article was circulated widely. First published in a magazine with a readership of three 
million, it was reprinted across other titles, with abstracts appearing in the New York Times and 
other newspapers.65 Luce’s piece was a call for robust American internationalism and assumption 
of global leadership. Public comments poured in from around the country in response to the 
piece, and politicians took the ideas to the floors of Congress.66 The ‘American century’ was 
specifically invoked in support of internationalist resolutions put before the House of 
Representatives.67 However, not all official response to Luce’s article was positive. In 1942 Vice 
President Wallace criticized the ‘American century’ thesis in an article of his own, arguing that 
the future ought not to be dominated by one nation, but by the common mass of people 
globally.68 Regardless of whether one agreed, Luce’s arguments became deeply influential in the 
discourse on America’s Asia policy, and could not simply be ignored. 
 
                                                 
62 Lippmann cites Lattimore in his discussions of China in both books. Lattimore, a Sinophile blinded to the 
weakness of Chiang’s government, was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a government adviser 
during the war.  
63 Lippmann, US Foreign Policy, 154–56.  
64 An indicator of this conviction, and its connection to traditional missionary activity, is Luce’s role in founding 
United China Relief in 1939.  
65 Hunt, ‘East Asia in Henry Luce’s “American Century”,’ 321. 
66 Luce kept these response letters, both negative and positive. They make up several folders within his personal 
papers. Box 180. Henry Luce papers, Library of Congress. His article was read into the Congressional record. U.S. 
Congress, House, 77th Cong., 1st session, 5 March 1941, Congressional Record 87:1828–31. 
67 Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 77th Congress, First Session. Speech of Martin J Kennedy 
of New York House of Representatives, 6 March 1941. Box 31 Henry Luce Folder. America First Committee Papers, 
Hoover Institution Archive, Stanford University. 
68 Henry A. Wallace, as cited in White, ‘The “American Century” in World History’, 115. 
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Luce’s beliefs had implications for postwar planning on Japan.69 He thought that America had a 
special destiny as the inheritor of Western civilization, and that Asia would desire, take up, and 
benefit from American technology, culture, and patronage. The article reinforced the circulating 
ideas that China would become the new Asian great power and America’s most important ally in 
the Pacific, supplanting Japan as the most modern and powerful Asian nation. This vision of 
postwar East Asia imagined a diminished world status for Japan, making its future less 
important. But Luce’s call for the country to commit itself to the spread of American values 
worldwide also fit neatly with the idea of a long, potentially expensive, American intervention in 
postwar Japan. The boldness of the ‘American century’ was reflected in the most radical 
proposals for how Americans might deal with defeated Japan.  
 
Time Inc. 
 
It is difficult to overestimate the place of Luce’s Time Inc. publications in American life during 
the 1930s and 40s. Its major output comprised three magazine titles, Time, Life and Fortune. 
Time and Life were popular, accessible publications. Life in particular used an image heavy 
format to appeal to the middle classes. Fortune, better researched and more reflective, targeted a 
narrower audience of educated businessmen. In addition to these publications, Time Inc 
increased its media presence with widely consumed newsreels and radio programs. It has been 
estimated that by the end of the war 30 million Americans read or at least skimmed a Time Inc. 
publication every week.70  
 
Henry Luce, as the man behind the company, took a deep editorial interest in the content of his 
publications. Two issues, both tied to the treatment of Japan, were of particular interest to him; 
these dealt with representations of China and with postwar planning. His sympathies toward 
China in general and the Nationalist regime in particular were reflected in the editorial policy of 
Time publications, especially following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. In a 
demonstration of the popular publication’s support, the Chiangs were named ‘Man & Wife of the 
Year’ by Time in 1937. The corresponding article offered a characteristically positive view of the 
American-educated Madame Chiang, noting that ‘Her rise and that of her husband, the 
Generalissimo, in less than a generation to moral and material leadership of the ancient Chinese 
people cover a great page of history.’71 Luce used such promotion, in addition to positive 
accounts and simplifications to help American readers relate to China, in order to generate 
support for his view of the country.72 
 
Luce’s dogged support for Chiang and his Kuomintang (KMT) government and editorial 
intervention along these lines drew both support and criticism amongst contemporaries and is 
remembered by historians as the hallmark of his editorial influence. In 1946 China expert John 
Fairbank remarked that Luce, in his support for Chiang, had ‘prostituted the truth and his own 
staff for policy purposes.’73 Criticisms of the regime and reports of political instability in China 
did find their way into Time Inc publications from time to time, but editors and journalists were 
                                                 
69 For an overview of Luce’s ideas on East–West relations, see White, ‘The “American Century” in World History,’ 
114. 
70 Herzstein, Henry R. Luce, 50. 
71 ‘Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-Shek’.  
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Images of China, 39‒43.  
73 As cited in Herzstein, Henry R. Luce, 60. For an orthodox description of Luce’s pro-China editorial policy, see 
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aware of Luce’s slant and altered their work to accommodate it. In 1942 Pearl S. Buck wrote to 
Luce with a general overview of their shared position on China’s value to the United States, and 
ended the letter with the comment that she would like to write a piece on the subject for Life 
‘with pleasure and wrath.’74 Despite this common ground and the article being written with Luce 
in mind, the submitted piece was critical of the corruption which permeated the KMT. After 
some personal struggle over printing a perspective he disagreed with and which he believed 
would be harmful to the cause so near his heart, Luce decided to run the article, rationalizing that 
he did ‘not want to be found guilty of misleading the American people’ by failing to report on 
negative developments in China.75 Still, such decisions were rare, and remained firmly in the 
hands of one powerful figure. 
 
Henry Luce became interested in postwar planning quite early. Days after Pearl Harbor, Time 
inaugurated what it called its ‘Q’ or ‘Postwar’ Department. The group was meant to provide all 
Time Inc. publications with articles and opinion pieces on the coming world. The group was 
quiet until 1943, when Luce became more actively engaged with its work. In February of that 
year, Luce visited Washington to meet with the nation’s top officials in order to better understand 
the state and content of government planning.76 After his return from Washington Luce became 
more involved in the group, rechristened the ‘Policy Formulation Committee,’ attending 
brainstorming sessions and providing his own opinions for circulated memos.77 Although he 
delegated day to day work to editors, Luce maintained final authority over decisions across Time 
Inc. titles, and expected publications to reflect his views. As he reminded his editors, ‘if there is 
any gospel around here it is the Post-War Memos’ which he approved and circulated.78 Luce’s 
need to delegate and willingness to accept some opposing views undermined the totality of his 
influence as editor. However, his championship of Nationalist China and his ideas, well known 
and deeply entrenched on issues close to the Japan question, certainly indicate the importance of 
Henry Luce as a gatekeeper to the news and views presented in American media. 
 
Spreading Influence and Ideas 
 
In The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs, Robert Schulzinger argued that elites outside the 
government often reflected official policy because bureaucrats, politicians, businessmen and 
academics came from the same sorts of elite social circles.79 Thus, shared ideas were the result of 
the similarities across types of elites. In the case of leading media figures, the connection is even 
deeper than Schulzinger suggested. These people were part of the same social circles, with 
human relationships built on informal social connections. Through personal networks, media 
elites joined the policy-making process as active elements in the evolution of ideas out of which 
formal policy grew and was accepted. Ideas were discussed and defended, assumptions and 
visions were shared in unrecorded, informal environments. These individuals were already part 
of official and unofficial planning groups and were invited to share ideas and join associations, 
committees and government departments, further enmeshing them in the process. 
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Authors and policy-makers shared comments on early drafts of essays and articles. In this way, 
they became engaged in the ideas circulated in the media in a more complex fashion, both 
shaping and being shaped by media discourse. Examples of this kind of collaboration abound. 
Stanley Hornbeck, the former head of the State Department’s Far Eastern department and 
influential Sinophile, sent Lippmann a memorandum of his ‘observations’ on the collapse of the 
Hull negotiations which led to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although Lippmann did not cite the 
memorandum, it is possible that Hornbeck’s views on Japan and China, which were similar to 
Owen Lattimore’s, contributed to Lippmann’s perspective on the Far East presented in his 
wartime publications.80 Lippmann in turn both offered comments on a draft manuscript for 
Secretary of State Ed Stettinius and asked Grew to read and give opinions on Japan-related 
sections of his own book manuscript.81 This practice was also common within respected but 
unofficial policy circles. In 1941, John Foster Dulles, who was then working on postwar 
planning within the Christian community and would later become Secretary of State, wrote to the 
Secretary of the American Council, Edward C. Carter, to comment on a draft monograph 
‘postwar worlds’ before its publication.82 
 
One particularly good example of the way in which these draft reviews helped circulate ideas is 
Joseph Grew’s pre-publication reading of ‘What Future for Japan?’ by Asia specialist Lawrence 
K. Rosinger.83 Grew offered suggestions for Rosinger to incorporate and expressed disagreement 
with some of the author’s assumptions about postwar Japan. A month later, Grew sent both 
Rosinger’s draft article and his own comments to Navy Secretary James Forrestal, suggesting 
that they meet over lunch and discuss the ideas presented. ‘I am sure,’ Grew wrote, ‘that a talk 
[about the treatment of postwar Japan] would be mutually helpful.’84 Although no record exists 
for these and other informal meetings, they form an important part of consensus building among 
officials. Such discussions, sparked by media articles, brought government departments closer 
together and had a direct impact on American policy toward postwar Japan.  
 
Personal Connections 
 
Soft connections knitted a few important media figures into influential circles. For example, their 
shared interest in China generated correspondence between Henry Luce and Cordell Hull 
through the United China Relief organization.85 Walter Lippmann, charming and worldly, was an 
active member of the social networks of New York and Washington. The Lippmanns’ wartime 
social calendar included meals with the Dean Achesons and the Henry Stimsons.86 In 1939 the 
Lippmanns rented the house of future Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Director and Roosevelt 
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confidant William Donovan.87 Gift giving too was a source of warmth in relationships. Senator 
Vandenburg, having received from Luce a box of cigars, included in his thank-you note an 
invitation to meet at Luce’s convenience.88 Birthday, Christmas, and get-well cards were sent and 
saved; they reinforced the human bonds between policy makers.  
 
Regular correspondence made for easy sharing of information between journalists and officials. 
Throughout the war, powerful figures like Forrestal and Stimson wrote to Lippmann to set up 
lunches and meetings and discuss the ideas presented in his columns.89 In May 1944 Walter 
Lippmann telephoned Joseph Grew to tell him about a conversation with Soviet diplomat 
Vladimir Sergeyvich Pravdin. The two discussed Russian interests in the Pacific. Russia, 
Lippmann told Grew, had renewed territorial ambitions in Port Arthur, a warm-water port in the 
Far East which had been a source of imperial rivalry since the nineteenth century. The Soviets 
were also concerned about how cooperation with the Chinese communists in fighting the 
Japanese would be perceived in Washington and Chongqing. Grew had this information typed 
into a memorandum, which he then passed to the Secretary of State.90 Later that year, Lippmann 
visited Henry Stimson after returning from a trip to France. He took the opportunity to express 
his views on the planned occupation of Germany, arguing that the country would remain a threat 
even under occupation and suggesting that the country be permanently divided.91 Information 
and ideas moved between formal and informal channels at such meetings. 
 
Opinion leaders developed reputations as active members of policy circles, and as a result were 
invited to join planning groups and committees. Shortly before America went to war, Bill 
Donovan began preparing for his new job as coordinator of defense information, a position 
which would evolve into head of the OSS.92 To begin the project, Donovan wanted a group of 
eight or nine well informed individuals to meet informally and create a set of future scenarios for 
his staff to use as the basis of their first reports. Archibald MacLeish, working for Donovan, 
wrote to Luce that as ‘the world’s greatest’ editor, ‘we have to have you as one of the group.’93 
Henry Luce joined what they called the ‘glass ball shooting committee,’ which met at Donovan’s 
home to set the agenda for OSS research. In 1943, MacLeish, then assistant director of the OWI, 
wrote to Luce again, asking for opinions and comments on a draft background sheet on China 
because of his authority on the subject.94 Walter Lippmann, who enjoyed both public regard and 
personal associations with men in the highest level of government, was asked to become 
undersecretary of state in 1945, a position which he politely refused.95  
 
Conclusion 
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As the major source of information available to the public on current and foreign affairs, popular 
media played an important role in both reflecting and shaping public opinion. However, linking 
media coverage and policy-making is not simple. The relationship between media, public 
opinion, politicians’ perception of opinion and decision-making is complex.96 Despite these 
serious limitations, popular media is useful for capturing a sense of the ‘public mood’ in this 
period. Certainly, contemporary politicians were greatly concerned with the media as both an 
indicator of public opinion on specific issues and as a powerful factor in forming that opinion. 
President Roosevelt, for example, requested and read weekly reports on these op-ed pieces and 
surveys of newspaper clippings.97 Foreign leaders also had access to American media output. As 
domestic politicians used summaries of the press in order to understand their constituents, 
America’s allies used them to draw conclusions about US interests and intentions.98 This 
window, dim and distorting as it may have been, was especially important in subjects like 
postwar planning where US diplomats were secretive or unclear about national aims. Thus, 
despite the flaws of using popular media to evaluate public opinion, it was indeed regarded as 
measure of that phenomenon by American and Allied policy makers. Media was therefore the 
major connection between the American public and American policy-making. And, to the extent 
that it did convey a sense of the ‘public mood’ in a broad sense, media indicators are important in 
understanding how Americans thought about the role of their country in Asia and the future of 
Japan.  
 
Opinion leaders – editors, journalists and expert contributors – comprised a clear group of actors 
interested in Japan’s future and active in shaping policy. Distinct from media, though tied to it 
through publications, the cases examined in this chapter were part of an internationalist in-group 
involved in planning. Luce and Lippmann were both elite East Coast internationalists who called 
for expanding American influence and protecting American interests abroad. These two were 
particularly influential because of their large readerships and deep interlinkage with officials, but 
were part of a more diverse group including Pearl S. Buck, Owen Lattimore, Anne O’Hare 
McCormick and many others. Opinion leaders both shaped and reflected the ideas of planners 
because of their shared personal backgrounds and social interaction, control over available 
material, correspondence and collaboration. The divide between officials and outside elites 
during the war was porous. Through personal connections and established reputations, 
journalists, authors and editors shared ideas and knowledge, engaged in formal and informal 
planning, tried to influence policy based on personal beliefs, and were invited to join the 
government themselves. Individuals and ideas moved in both directions. Just as it is difficult to 
chart the spread of ideas, it is difficult to distinguish between shaping and being shaped in such a 
two-way flow of information. The patterns of interaction examined here expanded what might be 
called the ‘policy making community’ to include area specialists, opinion columnists, editors, 
and publishers. 
 
Rosy coverage helped create unrealistic expectations for a postwar China which would be a close 
ally and the dominant power in postwar Asia. This conception made it possible to sideline Japan 
as a major power in future plans. Before and during the war, popular media reinforced anti-Asian 
racial stereotypes and the dehumanization of the Japanese, stirring wartime race-hate. However, 
print media also made the work done by the opinion leaders and other groups involved in 
wartime planning available to the public. Newspapers published analysis on postwar Japan from 
books, conference summaries and speeches. These short distillations of careful and nuanced 
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approaches to complex issues ensured that ordinary Americans were not strangers to the broad 
outlines of postwar Japan policy. The lines of future policy were uncertain within and outside 
government, particularly during the Roosevelt Administration. However, during the war the news 
media provided a crucial service in exposing the reading public to ideas that would prepare them 
for what was to come. Newspapers covered the ‘soft’ peace based on Japanese cooperation that, 
as the situation on the ground changed dramatically with the start of the Chinese civil war and 
the rise of a Cold War, would become the basis for a new alliance between America and Japan.  
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